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Investigating People’s Privacy Risk Perception
Abstract: Although media reports often warn about
risks associated with using privacy-threatening tech-
nologies, most lay users lack awareness of particular ad-
verse consequences that could result from this usage.
Since this might lead them to underestimate the risks
of data collection, we investigate how lay users perceive
different abstract and specific privacy risks. To this end,
we conducted a survey with 942 participants in which
we asked them to rate nine different privacy risk sce-
narios in terms of probability and severity. The survey
included abstract risk scenarios as well as specific risk
scenarios, which describe specifically how collected data
can be abused, e.g., to stalk someone or to plan burglar-
ies. To gain broad insights into people’s risk perception,
we considered three use cases: Online Social Networks
(OSN), smart home, and smart health devices. Our re-
sults suggest that abstract and specific risk scenarios are
perceived differently, with abstract risk scenarios being
evaluated as likely, but only moderately severe, whereas
specific risk scenarios are considered to be rather severe,
but only moderately likely. People, thus, do not seem to
be aware of specific privacy risks when confronted with
an abstract risk scenario. Hence, privacy researchers or
activists should make people aware of what collected
and analyzed data can be used for when abused (by the
service or even an unauthorized third party).
Keywords: privacy risk perception, Online Social Net-
works, smart home devices, smart health devices
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1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is a multitude of online services that
are offered free of charge – at least at first glance. In-
stead of money, people are paying with the data that
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the service providers collect from them. Survey results
indicate that the users of these services – including lay
users – are indeed aware of this business model, i.e., that
the service providers collect as much information about
them as possible in return for the free services [1–3]. At
the same time, the majority of users express concerns
about such handling of their personal data [1–3].
Thus, it seems hard to believe people are actu-
ally surprised about the handling of their data every
time they hear about a particularly bold privacy vio-
lation [4–6] when, at the same time, they continue to
use privacy threatening online services and technologies
exactly the same way they used to do prior to these
revelations. The way people make (privacy) decisions
gives us some insights into this paradoxical behavior [7]:
The perceived risk determines how likely people are to
protect their privacy. Yet, lay users have only a vague
understanding of concrete consequences that can result
from data collection [8–10]. When asked to name pos-
sible consequences, they often only refer to “personal-
ized advertising”, with some users even considering this
beneficial [11]. This lack of understanding of possible
consequences leads users to making intuitive risk judg-
ments [12]. Garg, Benton and Camp [13] found that
while the perceived risk of information sharing is the
most important determinant of privacy behavior, users
tend to share their personal data because they do not
know about negative consequences that may arise and
thus perceive the risk to be rather low.
Consequently, one could assume that the “holy
grail” in motivating users to protect their privacy is to
tell them about possible consequences that could result
from data collection. However, research in the area of
risk perception and communication tells us that people
tend to base their decisions on perceived risk instead
of actual risk [14, 15]. The goal of risk communication
must therefore be to reduce, if not close, the gap be-
tween perceived risk and actual risk [14, 16]. The first
step in achieving this goal is to evaluate how users per-
ceive different privacy risks, either describing the gen-
eral possibility of harm resulting from data collection
or specifying how data collection might lead to negative
consequences.
To this end, we conducted an online survey with 942
participants in which we asked them to rate nine differ-
ent privacy risk scenarios (applying a between-subject
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design) according to their probability and severity. Since
people often lack knowledge of potential privacy conse-
quences [8–10, 13], which could lead them to grossly
underestimate abstract risk scenarios in comparison to
risk scenarios that state a particular consequence result-
ing from data collection [17], we included various ab-
stract risk scenarios such as “data and usage patterns
are collected” as well as various specific ones such as
“the collected and analyzed information can be abused
for targeted burglaries”.
Additionally, early research on the awareness of on-
line risks [18] has shown that unfamiliarity with a tech-
nology leads to lower risk perceptions, whereas other
studies indicate that unknown technologies are consid-
ered to be more risky [19, 20]. Therefore, we included
three different use cases of which one (Online Social
Networks / OSN) is well-known to most people, while
two (smart home and smart health devices) are, in com-
parison to OSN, a comparably new topic to the major-
ity of people. All of these three technologies typically
collect large amounts of sensitive data and they are ei-
ther currently already used by a large amount of people
or are likely to be used in the future by many people.
This approach allows us to compare the risk evalua-
tions for well-established and leading-edge technologies.
Again, we implemented a between-subject design, i.e.,
each participant saw only one privacy risk scenario and
was assigned to one use case.
Our results indicate that specific risk scenarios, e.g.,
stalking and targeted burglary, are considered to be
more severe, but less likely compared to abstract risk
scenarios. Specific risk scenarios are perceived to be
most severe if they include a threat to one’s physical
safety or the possibility of financial loss. Concerning
the abstract risk scenarios, the collection of data is per-
ceived to be most likely and, in most instances, also
most severe. Furthermore, the specific risk scenarios as-
sociated with the use of OSN are perceived as less severe
than the specific risk scenarios associated with using
smart home and smart health devices. Most of the risk
scenarios related to the use of smart home devices are
evaluated as most likely.
Our results provide several insights for privacy re-
searchers or activists who aim to raise people’s aware-
ness of privacy risks by conducting privacy interventions
or awareness campaigns: First, it is neither sufficient to
focus on abstract nor on single specific privacy risks,
since the former are considered to be less severe and
the latter to be less likely. Hence, the most promising
approach would be to mention the collection of data and
also include a variation of specific privacy risks to ac-
count for different personal life situations. This should
also raise people’s evaluation of how likely the risks de-
scribed will occur. Adequate candidates for such specific
risks are those which comprise a physical safety com-
ponent or the possibility of financial loss, since these
are considered to be the most severe. Second, different
use cases might call for different risks in terms of risk
communication, with those risks which provide the best
opportunity for an attacker to harm the user in a par-
ticular use case being the most promising.
2 Related Work
Our work relates to general risk perception, risk com-
munication, and more specifically to the awareness and
perception of privacy and IT security risks.
2.1 Risk Perception
Research on the perception of technological risks dates
back to 1969, when Starr showed that the acceptance
of risks is influenced by subjective dimensions such as
the voluntariness of risk exposure [21]. Research in the
following decades focused on the psychometric model
paradigm to identify which factors influence risk per-
ception. The most popular model is the canonical nine-
dimensional model of perceived risk [22], which has been
used extensively to study perceived risk offline for a di-
verse set of risks, e.g., health risks and environmental
risks. According to Fischoff et al. [22], risk perception in-
creases if risks are perceived as involuntary, immediate,
unknown, uncontrollable, new, dreaded, catastrophic,
and severe.
In the IT context, it has been used, e.g., to exam-
ine insider threats as well as security risks [19]. Yet the
adoption of the Fischoff-model in the IT context has
also been criticized. For example, a survey study on the
perceived risk of several online threats revealed that the
original risk dimensions only account for 13.07 % of the
variance in people’s risk perception, with severity alone
explaining most of this variance. The authors reduced
the model to four dimensions and found that these were
able to explain 77% of the variance in risk perception
with temporal impact (newness and common-dread) be-
ing the most important dimension for people’s risk per-
ception. New and uncommon threats were evaluated to
be more risky, which is contrary to the results of Fried-
man et al. [18], who found that unfamiliarity with a
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technology leads to lower risk perceptions. We therefore
look into three different use cases, of which one (OSN)
is well-known to most people, whereas the other two
(smart home and smart health devices) are rather new
to the majority of lay users.
It has also been shown that, when it comes to tech-
nology, experts and lay users differ in the way they eval-
uate risks: Whereas experts base their judgments mainly
on the objective probability and severity of a risk, lay
users tend to rely on past experiences [23, 24], which can
result in severe misjudgments that need to be addressed
in awareness campaigns or other privacy interventions.
Our main interest thus lies in investigating lay users’
risk perceptions.
2.2 Risk Communication
Research on risk communication often refers to the
“mental models approach”, a framework according to
which the mental models of the recipients of risk com-
munication are supposed to be improved by adding
missing knowledge, restructuring knowledge, or remov-
ing misconceptions [25]. Looking at lay users’ mental
models of privacy risks, we often find that they lack
understanding of consequences that could result from
data collection [8–10, 13]. We thus chose to include gen-
eral risk scenarios and such describing particular con-
sequences of data collection to investigate whether par-
ticipants’ risk evaluations increase when they are con-
fronted with specific consequences. This is also in line
with a seminal paper by Slovic [26], who suggests to
mention possible adverse consequences when communi-
cating risks to the public to increase their concerns.
Lay users were also found to focus on privacy con-
sequences that happen online: For example, in a survey
in which participants were prompted to name privacy
consequences only 15% mentioned “real world” conse-
quences such as stalking (3%) or employment risks (2%).
On the other hand, 23% mentioned consequences asso-
ciated with identity theft or financial loss (23%) [27].
According to the availability heuristic, people tend to
overestimate the probability of risks that come easier to
mind [17]. We thus included both kinds of consequences
in our study in order to investigate whether they also
differ in terms of perceived probability and security.
Camp [28] proposes the application of mental mod-
els for risk communication in the IT security and pri-
vacy context. She strongly argues for the use of physical
and criminal metaphors in risk communication, e.g., by
framing computer risks as risks of becoming victims of
a crime. Although this approach aims at communicat-
ing security risks instead of privacy risks, we include
these considerations in the phrasing of our risk scenar-
ios by (1) telling the participants that the collection of
their data could possibly harm them and thereby de-
scribing them as victims, and (2) referring to physical
consequences such as stalking or burglary that happen
in “the real world”.
2.3 Privacy and IT Security Risk
Awareness and Perception
There have been several studies on users’ awareness of
privacy risks in different contexts, e.g., eHealth [29],
WiFi connections [30], RFID chips [31], or in gen-
eral [11, 32]. These studies showed several misconcep-
tions on the users’ side, for example that hackers are
considered to be the most serious threat in the WiFi
context, that RFID chips could not be read without
auditory or visual feedback, or that users are immune
against most threats in the eHealth context. Overall,
the results indicate that users are unaware and lack un-
derstanding of many possible privacy threats and conse-
quences. We thus include a description of five different
privacy consequences that could result from, e.g., iden-
tity theft, in our risk scenarios.
Regarding the actual perception of privacy risks,
some studies only consider rather abstract privacy risks:
Oomen and Leenes [33] conducted a study with
5,541 Dutch students in which they asked them how con-
cerned they were about different privacy risks. Partici-
pants were least concerned about unjust treatment and
most about the invasion of their private sphere. How-
ever, the authors focused on rather abstract risks like
“Loss of freedom” or “Invasion of the private sphere”
and did not find much difference between the ratings.
We investigate whether describing more specific conse-
quences leads to more distinguished ratings.
Skirpan et al. [16] conducted a survey study with
experts and lay users and identified identity theft,
account breach, and job loss as the top rated tech-
related risk scenarios. Whereas Skirpan et al. provided
a list of rather abstract technological risks associated
with emerging technologies without describing how and
which consequences could result from these risks, we
include abstract risks and particular privacy risks stat-
ing how, e.g., identity theft could lead to harassment in
OSN. Furthermore, we investigate participants’ percep-
tion of these risks in three different use cases.
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Other studies do not allow us to draw conclu-
sions about participants’ risk perception due to method-
ological factors: Karwatzki et al. [34] ran a total
of 22 focus groups in which they asked their par-
ticipants directly to name all privacy consequences
they are aware of. The authors derive seven cat-
egories of privacy consequences based on the re-
sponses: physical, social, resource-related, psychologi-
cal, prosecution-related, career-related, and freedom-
related consequences. Albeit providing valuable insights
into peoples’ awareness of privacy consequences, Kar-
watzki et al. do not investigate how risky these conse-
quences are evaluated. Since this is the most extensive
study that has been conducted so far on people’s aware-
ness of privacy consequences, we base our selection of
privacy risk scenarios on the categories of different pri-
vacy risks identified by Karwatzki et al. (see section 3.4).
Woodruff et al. [35] conducted a survey study in
which they asked participants to indicate for 20 differ-
ent privacy-related scenarios with varying (positive and
negative) outcomes whether they would provide their
data if they knew this would be the outcome. Their
participants were more or less completely unwilling to
provide information in any of the negative scenarios.
Considering that participants have no reasonable moti-
vation to share their data if they know something nega-
tive will result from this, we decided not to ask whether
they are willing to share their data in a particular sce-
nario, but to assess their evaluation of a risk by asking
them to rate the probability and severity of this risk.
Again, other studies focus on the perception of risks
in the IT and online context in general, albeit with-
out considering privacy risks: LeBlanc and Biddle [36]
conducted a survey study on the risk perception of dif-
ferent Internet and non-Internet related activities with
94 participants using Amazon Mechanical Turk. Their
results show that activities carrying the possibility of
financial loss were evaluated as most severe, whereas
potentially embarrassing activities were considered to
be most likely.
In two survey studies, Harbach, Fahl and Smith [8]
prompted Amazon MTurk panelists and German stu-
dents to provide risks and consequences they associate
with using the Internet. Participants were also asked
to rate the severity and likelihood of the provided risks
and consequences. Loss of privacy was rated to be by
far the most likely consequence. Damage to one’s health
and large financial loss were rated as most severe. How-
ever, most people were only able to provide a few con-
sequences and were unaware of the majority of possible
consequences. Thus, we deploy a similar approach by
asking our participants to rate the severity and prob-
ability of privacy risks, but provide participants with
different privacy risks.
Conducting a survey study at their university, Garg
and Camp [20] found that most of the variance in their
participants’ evaluation of IT security risks was ex-
plained by how new and common these risks are, with
new and uncommon risks receiving higher risk ratings.
Further, risks that have an analogue in the physical
world were rated as being riskier than those who lack
physical analogues.
We aim to close this research gap by evaluating
lay users’ perception of abstract as well as specific pri-
vacy risks describing particular consequences that could
harm the user. To this end, we deploy the established
definition of risk perception as the perceived probabil-
ity of adverse consequences and the perceived severity
of those [14, 37].
3 Methodology
This section describes our methodological approach. We
describe our research question, the recruitment process
and the sample, the study material and design, and eth-
ical considerations.
3.1 Research Question
We conducted a survey study with 942 participants to
answer the following research question:
RQ: How do lay users evaluate privacy risks that are
associated with the use of established and new technolo-
gies, i.e., Online Social Networks (OSN), smart home
and smart health devices?
3.2 Recruitment and Participants
We recruited our participants using the German panel
“clickworker” [38], which is similar to Amazon Mechani-
cal Turk, but focuses on European users, with German-
speaking people being the largest user group [39]. We
only recruited German-speaking users for our survey in
order to prevent methodical artifacts resulting from par-
ticipants evaluating the risk scenario texts in a foreign
language (see 5.4 for a discussion about cultural influ-
ences). We used the clickworker IDs of those panelists
who had participated in the pilot study to dismiss them
from the main study in order to prevent participation
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Table 1. Participants’ age.














N 51 188 315 186 120 65 15 1
% 5.4 20.0 33.5 19.8 12.8 6.9 1.6 0.1
in both studies. Participants of the pilot and the main
study both received a compensation of 2.10e.
A total of 942 participants completed our study. We
used the exploratory data analysis function in SPSS 24.0
to check for answer patterns and whether participants
took at least 3 minutes to complete the questionnaire
(this value was chosen based on pretests). Note that the
average time needed to complete the study is higher, as
the study also included a part with open answer ques-
tions [40], which took participants much longer to com-
plete than the quantitative questions that are described
in this paper. None had to be excluded from the anal-
ysis due to technical problems or invalid answers. This
seems surprising, but might be due to the fact that all
questions were mandatory and thus needed to be an-
swered in order to proceed with the study. Thus, par-
ticipants who were not sufficiently motivated to com-
plete the study adequately were likely to have dropped
out before finishing the questionnaire. Due to technical
restrictions of the clickworker panel, we unfortunately
have no record of how many participants dropped out
before finishing the questionnaire.
The final sample includes 942 participants (417 fe-
male, 517 male, 3 others, 5 chose not to answer this ques-
tion). Participants’ age is listed in Table 1. Most partic-
ipants reported to use OSN often or sometimes, whereas
only about one third stated to use smart home or smart
health devices frequently. Participants reported a me-
dian of 0 years for IT security expertise and are thus
considered to be lay users. According to the IUIPC ques-
tionnaire [41], participants were rather concerned about
their privacy with an average of 3.51 (the scale ranging
from 1, indicating low levels of concern, to 5, indicating
high levels of concern; SD=0.75, med=3.5).
3.3 Use Cases
We investigate three different use cases one of which is
well-known to most people (OSN) and two are a rather
new topic to the majority of lay users (smart home and
smart health devices). This approach allows us to draw
conclusions about lay users’ risk perception of already
established and emerging technologies, as prior research
has provided evidence for novel technologies being per-
ceived as less risky [18], as well as more risky [19, 20]
than well-known technologies.
We decided to include OSN in our study since this
kind of technology is used by a considerably large num-
ber of people (with 2.46 billion users in 2017 [42]). Fur-
thermore, the topic of OSN privacy risks is relatively
well-covered in media reports [43–45]. Smart home and
smart health devices, on the other hand, should be new
ground for most lay users. Hence, it is possible that they
did not put much thought on potential privacy risks
emerging from the use of these devices so far. However,
smart home and smart health devices combine several
sensors and thus collect and analyze a multiplicity of –
often sensitive – data, in the case of smart home devices
in an environment deemed to be most private, and in
the case of smart health devices about a highly sensitive
data type. As both technologies are constantly spread-
ing, this makes them interesting candidates for studying
users’ evaluation of privacy risks.
3.4 Privacy Risk Scenarios
We chose to include four scenarios in our study which
describe abstract privacy risks and thus leave it to the
participant to interpret what actual consequences could
arise from the collection and analysis of their data. We
further included five specific risk scenarios with each of
them focusing on a particular consequence of data col-
lection and analysis. Those were based on categories of
privacy risks lay users associate with the access to their
personal data identified by Karwatzki et al. [34]. This
combination allows us to compare how users perceive
scenarios with different levels of specificity, as prior re-
search has shown that users often lack knowledge about
possible privacy consequences [8–10, 13], which could
lead them to underestimate the risk of abstract pri-
vacy risk scenarios but make better judgments when
confronted with a concrete consequence resulting from
a risk scenario.
We refer to “the manufacturer” (for the smart home
and smart health use case1) and “the service provider”
(for the OSN use case) as the one who collects the data.
This decision was based on prior research, which has
1 We chose the manufacturer for these use cases as there are
often multiple devices from various manufacturers in a smart
home or smart health setting and the term “service provider”
thus might have confused our participants for it is not clear who
is the service provider in this setting.
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shown that people are almost always scared of crimi-
nals (e.g., hackers) accessing their data, whereas data
collection by the manufacturer or service provider is
sometimes considered to be acceptable [46]. Yet, tak-
ing a look at the privacy policies and terms of use of
popular OSN, smart home, and smart health devices,
it can be assumed that manufacturers collect at least
some kind of data. According to the concept of contex-
tual integrity [47], people’s evaluation of data collections
depends on whether (1) this collection and processing
is appropriate in the given context, and (2) meets gov-
ernmental regulations. We were thus interested in how
people perceive potential threats arising from this data
collection, which describe inappropriate as well as illegal
processing of their data. The texts used in the study to
describe the privacy risks are presented below. All texts
were presented in German and translated for the paper.
Abstract Privacy Risk Scenarios. Abstract risk
scenarios vaguely refer to an unspecific risk, without
stating how the user could be harmed. The first privacy
risk scenario, (R1), focuses on the “collection” of infor-
mation and usage patterns, thereby reflecting a phrase
typically used in the media to talk about data assess-
ment in the digital context [48, 49]. The following risk
scenarios (R2) and (R3) successively add more informa-
tion by also saying that the collected data are analyzed
and explaining the concept of meta data. Finally, (R4)
more straightforwardly points at an unspecific risk by
saying that the results of the analysis could be utilized
to harm the user. The actual texts we used in the study
are the following ones:
– (R1) Your entered data and usage patterns are col-
lected by the various manufacturers of [use case2].
– (R2) Your entered data and usage patterns are col-
lected and analyzed by the various manufacturers
of [use case].
– (R3) Your entered data and usage patterns* are col-
lected and analyzed by the various manufacturers of
[use case].
*Usage patterns are defined as how one behaves
with regard to special services or devices. The be-
havior occurs repeatedly and does not necessarily
involve conscious behavior. Examples for usage pat-
terns are switching the light on at certain times or
ordering certain food on certain days.
2 Depending on the use case, the text contained either “smart
home devices”, “smart health devices”, or “Online Social Net-
works”.
– (R4) Your entered data and usage patterns* are col-
lected and analyzed by the various manufacturers of
[use case]. The results of the analysis can harm you.
*Usage patterns are defined [ ...] 3
Specific Privacy Risk Scenarios. The idea of specific
privacy risks is to describe a particular consequence of
data collection and analysis, thereby clarifying how the
data can be used to harm the participant. To identify
possible consequences, i.e., specific privacy risk scenar-
ios, we used the categorization of Karwatzki et al. [34],
who conducted a set of 22 focus groups on privacy
risks. They identified seven categories of risk scenarios
their participants are aware of: Freedom-related, phys-
ical, resource-related, social, career-related, psychologi-
cal and prosecution-related. We aimed to include a mix
of more and less obvious examples for these categories.
We did, however, not include the categories “Psycho-
logical” (negative impact on one’s peace of mind owing
to access to individuals’ information) and “Prosecution-
related” (legal actions taken against an individual owing
to access to individuals’ information), as we considered
the former one would be too hard to grasp for some par-
ticipants and the latter describes a risk that does likely
not apply to most users.
The specific texts we used in the study are the fol-
lowing ones (please note that the order of presentation
is random and does not reflect any assumptions about a
hierarchy in terms of severity and probability evaluation
of the described risk):
– (R5) [Freedom-related] Your entered data and usage
patterns* are collected and analyzed by the vari-
ous manufacturers of [use case]. The results of the
analysis can harm you by passing the results on to
your insurance company. This can restrain you in
the choice of your nutrition if you do not want to
get a worse premium rate.
*Usage patterns are defined [...]
– (R6) [Physical] Your entered data and usage pat-
terns* are collected and analyzed by the various
manufacturers of [use case]. The results of the analy-
sis can harm you since from the analysis it is known
where you are at what time. That way you can be-
come a victim of stalking.
*Usage patterns are defined [...]
– (R7) [Resource-related] Your entered data and us-
age patterns* are collected and analyzed by the var-
3 The same text presented in (R3) about usage patterns was
contained in (R4) and in all the specific privacy risk scenarios.
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Fig. 1. Study procedure.
ious manufacturers of [use case]. The results of the
analysis can harm you since from the evaluation it
is known when you are at home. That way targeted
burglaries can be planned.
*Usage patterns are defined [...]
– (R8) [Social] Your entered data and usage patterns*
are collected and analyzed by the various manufac-
turers of [use case]. The results of the evaluation
can harm you by unauthorized people taking over
your identity. That way inappropriate content can
be published on your behalf.
*Usage patterns are defined [...]
– (R9) [Career-related] Your entered data and usage
patterns* are collected and analyzed by the various
manufacturers of [use case]. The results of the eval-
uation can harm you by passing on the results to
your potential future employer. This can result in
worse chances of getting a new job.
*Usage patterns are defined [...]
3.5 Study Procedure
We used a 9x3-between-subject design, randomly as-
signing participants to one of the three considered tech-
nologies and one of the nine different risk scenarios. All
questionnaires were presented in German and imple-
mented in SoSciSurvey [50]. It took participants 13.68
minutes on average to complete the study (SD=7.38).
The presented study is part of a larger study on the
perception and awareness of privacy risks [40]. Those
parts of the study procedure which are relevant for the
presented research question are described below and dis-
played in Figure 1 (see section 7.3 in the appendix for
the whole questionnaire).
We first thanked participants and provided them
with information about our study. Participants were
asked to provide their consent for participation and pro-
cessing of their data by clicking on a button which was
labeled with “I agree”. We then asked participants to
indicate whether they used the three considered tech-
nologies, and if not, whether they liked to use them in
the future. Participants were then randomly assigned to
one specific technology which was introduced to them in
a brief descriptive text (see section 7.3 in the appendix).
In case they did not use the assigned technology, partici-
pants were prompted to imagine they would actually use
it in order to answer the questionnaires. We then showed
the participants one of the nine randomized texts (R1)-
(R9) describing potential privacy risk situations, with
four texts describing rather abstract privacy risk situa-
tions (section 3.4) and five texts focusing on specific risk
scenarios (section 3.4). Participants were asked to an-
swer two questionnaires assessing their evaluation of the
privacy risk. We used a scale consisting of four items to
assess the perceived probability of the privacy risk and
one item to assess the perceived severity of the privacy
risk. We decided to use a VAS, that is, a continuous
line with labels at both ends (e.g., “stongly agree” and
“strongly disagree”). Several researchers have proposed
to use Visual Analogue Scales (VAS) to overcome the
limitations of Likert scales, such as the data being ordi-
nally distributed (e.g., [51, 52]). In SoSciSurvey, which
we used to implement our questionnaire, these VAS as-
sess data between 1 and 100. The participants, however,
only saw the labels without the corresponding numbers.
Still, we think it is sensible to use these values for the
analysis, as it is common to talk about probabilities on
a percent basis, which ranges from 1 (or 0) to 100. To
maximize validity and reliability, we based our items
upon a previously validated instrument [7]. However, as
we adjusted the wording of the items to fit our research
purpose, we ran a pilot study to check whether the ad-
justed items still achieve sufficient psychometric values
(see section 3.6). We further asked participants to com-
plete the IUIPC questionnaire’s global information pri-
vacy concern scale [41]. Finally, we asked participants to
provide demographic information. On the last page, we
thanked the participants and provided them with con-
tact details in case any questions would occur, as well
as the code they needed to receive their compensation
from the panel.
3.6 Pilot Study
We conducted a pilot study with 45 participants (16 fe-
male, 28 male, 1 other, aged between 18 and at least
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56 years) to check the quality of our adjusted items.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three
use cases. Thus, every use case was considered by 15
participants. Internal consistency was checked for every
subscale and item-total correlation for every item to en-
sure the reliability and validity of the measures. As all
items showed satisfactory values (see section 7.2 in the
appendix), no items had to be omitted.
3.7 Ethics
All relevant ethical preconditions given for research with
personal data by our university’s ethics committee were
met. On the start page, all participants were informed
about the purpose and procedure of the present study.
Participants had the option to withdraw at any point
during the study without providing any reason and we
informed them that in this case all data collected so far
would be deleted. Participants were assured that their
data would not be linked to their identity and that the
responses would only be used for study purposes. Fur-
thermore, we used SoSciSurvey [50] for the survey im-
plementation, which stores all the data in Germany and
is thus subject to strict EU data protection law.
4 Results
This section describes our survey results, starting with
the perceived probability of the nine risk scenarios,
which is followed by the perceived severity. Finally, we
take a look at the relationship between both scales.
4.1 Perceived Probability
The data distribution for perceived probability of the
nine risk scenarios is displayed as box plots in Figure
2 on the left side. Whereas (R1) Collection (of data) is
considered to be very likely (with a median between
80% and 90%), participants are not so sure when it
comes to the specific risk scenarios (i.e., (R5) Nutrition,
(R6) Stalking, (R7) Burglary, (R8) Inappropriate con-
tent, (R9) Job application), which are located around
a median of 50%. Generally, the abstract risk scenar-
ios were considered to be more likely than the specific
risk scenarios. While our participants are quite certain
that their data are collected, they are undecided about
how this data collection could harm them. Apparently,
around half of the participants felt that chances were
Table 2. Results of the MANOVA regarding the comparison of
perceived probability of the risk scenarios (DV) between the dif-
ferent risk scenarios (IV).
df F-value Sig. partial η2
Social Network 8, 311 14.78 <.001** 0.28
Smart Home 8, 302 9.75 <.001** 0.21
Smart Health 8, 297 5.43 <.001** 0.13
good for any of the specific risk scenarios to happen,
whereas the other half thought it rather unlikely.
The vast majority of our participants thought that
chances were at least 50% that the analysis of the col-
lected data could harm them, which reflects the high
level of privacy concerns usually expressed in this con-
text [1, 2]. There are no notable differences regarding
the use cases, except for (R3) Usage patterns, which are
evaluated to be more likely when using OSN. Interest-
ingly, the collection and analysis of usage patterns is
rated as more likely than the mere collection and anal-
ysis without referring to usage patterns in the OSN and
smart health devices use case, suggesting that partici-
pants believe that their actual usage content (e.g., posts
in OSN, health data) is less likely to be analyzed than
their usage patterns.
The risk scenario that is perceived as least likely in
all three use cases is worse chances regarding (R9) Job
applications due to data sharing with possible future
employers. Yet, the specific risk scenarios do not differ
much among each other in as how likely participants
evaluate them.
We ran a MANOVA with the privacy risk scenario
and the use case as independent variables (IV) and the
mean of the perceived probability and severity of the
different risk scenarios as dependent variables (DV). All
assumptions for conducting a MANOVA were met. We
checked normality using Q-Q-Plots, and homoscedastic-
ity using the Levene-Test. The analysis showed signif-
icant differences regarding the perceived probability of
the different risk scenarios in all three use cases. In sum-
mary, the abstract risk scenarios were considered to be
more likely than the specific ones, with the collection
of data (R1) being the most and worse chances regard-
ing job applications (R9) being the least likely. Table 5
in the appendix provides an overview of the results of
the post-hoc pairwise comparisons, Table 2 shows the
results of the MANOVA regarding the perceived prob-
ability.
Social Network. Post-hoc tests using Sidak cor-
rection (as implemented in IBM SPSS 24.0) showed that
all of the specific risk scenarios (R5)-(R9) were consid-
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Fig. 2. Boxplots of the privacy risk evaluation data showing the medians and ranges for the probability ratings (left) and severity rat-
ings (right).
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ered to be less likely than the abstract ones (R1)-(R3)
(with p<.01). (R4) Possible harm was further consid-
ered to be more likely than (R5) Nutrition, (R7) Bur-
glary and (R9) Job application (p<.05).
Smart Home. All of the specific risks (R5)-(R9)
were considered to be less likely than (R1) Collection
(p<.01). (R2) Collection & analysis and (R4) Possi-
ble harm were further considered to be more likely
compared to (R7) Burglary and (R9) Job application
(p<.01). (R3) Usage patterns was considered to be more
likely than (R9) Job application and less likely than (R1)
Collection (p<.05).
Smart Health. (R1) Collection was considered
to be more likely than (R6) Stalking, (R7) Burglary,
(R8) Inappropriate content, and (R9) Job application
(p<.05). (R2) Collection & analysis was considered to
be more likely than (R6) Stalking, (R7) Burglary, and
(R9) Job application (p<.05). (R3) Usage patterns was
considered to be more likely than (R9) Job application.
The MANOVA showed no significant differences re-
garding the perceived probability of the different risk
scenarios between the three use cases (with p>.05), in-
dicating that the technology has no significant effect
on the perceived probability of the considered risk sce-
narios. There was also no significant interaction effect
between risk scenario and use case (p>.05).
4.2 Perceived Severity
Figure 2 shows the data distribution for perceived sever-
ity of the nine risk scenarios on the right side. Generally,
the specific risk scenarios were evaluated to be more se-
vere than the abstract risk scenarios, which provides
evidence for the assumption that people are generally
unaware of specific consequences that could result from
data collection and analysis but adjust their evaluation
when confronted with specific consequences. (R1) Col-
lection (of data) was perceived to be more severe than
the other abstract risk scenarios, including the combi-
nation of (R2) Collection & analysis. This is surprising,
considering that the potential for negative effects in-
creases if data are not only collected but also analyzed.
Since (R2) Collection & analysis also comprises the col-
lection of data, this scenario should be considered as at
least equally severe than (R1) Collection. Regarding the
specific risk scenarios, participants perceived (R7) Bur-
glary as most severe in all three use cases. This matches
previous research [8, 36], which has shown that people
dread risks associated with financial loss.
Table 3. Results of the MANOVA regarding the comparison of
perceived severity of the risk scenarios (DV) between the different
risk scenarios (IV).
df F-value Sig. partial η2
Social Network 8, 311 5.60 <.001** 0.13
Smart Home 8, 302 5.21 <.001** 0.12
Smart Health 8, 297 7.51 <.001** 0.17
The perceived severity of the abstract risks hardly
differed between the three use cases, except for (R4)
Possible harm with a median of 50 regarding the use
of OSN and smart health devices, and a median of 60
regarding the use of smart home devices. This suggests
that our participants had a slightly worse unspecific bad
feeling about the use of smart home devices, which is,
however, not reflected in their attitude regarding spe-
cific adverse consequences of smart home device usage.
How severe the specific risk scenarios were evaluated
also depends on the use context, with risk scenarios as-
sociated with OSN use being considered as less severe.
The statistical analysis further showed significant
differences regarding the perceived severity of the differ-
ent risks in all three use cases (see Table 3). In summary,
participants mostly dread (R6) Stalking and (R7) Bur-
glary, whereas the (R2) Collection & analysis of data is
considered as least severe. Table 6 in the appendix pro-
vides an overview of the results of the post-hoc pairwise
comparisons.
Social Network. Post-hoc tests using Sidak cor-
rection showed that (R6) Stalking was considered to be
more severe than (R2) Collection & analysis and (R9)
Job application (p<.05). (R7) Burglary was considered
to be more severe than (R2) Collection & analysis, (R3)
Usage patterns and (R9) Job application (p<.01). (R8)
Inappropriate content was considered to be more severe
than (R2) Collection & analysis, and (R9) Job applica-
tion (p<.05).
Smart Home. (R6) Stalking was considered to be
more severe than (R2) Collection & analysis (p<.01).
(R7) Burglary was considered to be more severe than
all of the abstract risk scenarios (R1)-(R4), as well as
(R8) Inappropriate content (p<.05).
Smart Health. (R6) Stalking was considered to
be more severe than (R2) Collection & analysis, (R3)
Usage patterns, and (R4) Possible harm (p<.01). (R7)
Burglary was considered to be more severe than all of
the abstract risks (R1)-(R4) (p<.01).
The MANOVA also showed significant differences
regarding the perceived severity of (R4) Possible harm
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Table 4. MANOVA results regarding the comparison of the per-
ceived severity (DV) between the different use cases (IV).
df F-value Sig. partial η2
(R1) Collection 2, 112 0.24 .78 0.004
(R2) Collection &
analysis
2, 103 0.78 .46 0.020
(R3) Usage patterns 2, 91 0.61 .55 0.010
(R4) Possible harm 2, 104 3.75 .03* 0.070
(R5) Nutrition 2, 98 0.22 .80 0.005
(R6) Stalking 2, 100 1.83 .17 0.040
(R7) Burglary 2, 102 3.00 .05 0.060
(R8) Inappropriate
content
2, 97 0.56 .57 0.010
(R9) Job application 2, 103 6.12 .003* 0.110
and (R9) Job application between the three use cases
(see Table 4).
(R4) Possible Harm. Post-hoc tests using Sidak
correction showed that the risk of possible harm was
considered to be more severe in the smart home device
than in the smart health device use case (p<.05).
(R9) Job Application. Post-hoc tests showed
that the risk of worst chances regarding job applica-
tions was considered to be less severe regarding the use
of OSN than smart home (p<.05) and smart health de-
vices (p<.01).
There was no significant interaction effect between
risk scenario and use case (p>.05).
4.3 Relationship Between Both Scales
The median values for perceived probability and sever-
ity are plotted in Figure 3 to display the relationship
between both scales. Overall, participants indicated a
higher probability for the abstract risk scenarios than
for the specific ones. The specific risk scenarios, on the
other hand, tend to be perceived as more severe, al-
though worse chances for (R9) Job applications received
lower values of perceived severity in the OSN and smart
home use case, whereas restricted freedom of (R5) Nu-
trition choice and the publication of (R8) Inappropriate
content were considered to be less severe or equal to the
collection of data and usage patterns in the smart home
devices use case.
In spite of these particular cases, the abstract and
the specific risk scenarios seem to build two clusters,
with the abstract ones, e.g., the collection of data be-
ing perceived as very likely but only of medium severity,
and the specific ones ranging between medium and high
severity, but at the same time are considered to be less
likely than the abstract ones (see Figure 3). We con-
ducted a hierarchical cluster analysis on the median val-
ues for likelihood and severity (using the Ward method
and squared euclidean distance) to test this hypothesis
and found two clusters for each use case, with cluster 1
including the abstract and cluster 2 the specific risk sce-
narios. Using Mann-Whitney-U-tests, we found that the
clusters differed significantly in terms of likelihood and
severity for all use cases (p<.05), except for likelihood
in the OSN use case with p=.19. This finding provides
some further insights into earlier work on risk perception
and communication, which suggests that specific conse-
quences of a risk should be communicated in order to
increase people’s perception of a risk [25, 26].
Regarding the median values, (R7) Burglary is per-
ceived to be the most severe risk scenario in all use cases,
but fails to exceed the 50% mark in probability. In con-
trast, (R6) Stalking related to the use of OSN and smart
home devices is perceived as somewhat more likely, but
at the same time less severe, except for the smart health
devices use case. Figure 4 combines all use cases in one
graph. Figure 5 displays the relationship between the
scales using scatterplots, R2 indicates the linear corre-
lation between the two scales.
The MANOVA showed no significant interactions
between the perceived probability and severity of the
nine risk scenarios (with p>.05).
5 Discussion
We conducted a survey study with 942 German par-
ticipants to investigate how lay users perceive different
privacy risks associated with the use of common (OSN)
and new technologies (smart home and smart health
devices). In this section, we discuss what these results
imply for future approaches of risk communication im-
plemented in awareness campaigns or privacy interven-
tions.
5.1 Abstract Privacy Risk Scenarios
The high values for perceived probability of the abstract
risk scenarios are not surprising, as abstract risks like
data collection comprise a large amount of possible sce-
narios and thus should carry a high probability. How-
ever, one could assume that all participants take the
collection of their data for a fact when using technolo-
gies like OSN, smart home, and smart health devices.
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Fig. 3. Relationship between the probability and severity rating scale displayed separately for each use case.
Yet, the mean and median values for this risk scenario
range between 75 and 90, implying that some lay users
still think their data might not be collected.
Considering the lower values for perceived severity,
lay users seem to not have specific risk scenarios or ad-
verse consequences in mind when confronted with an
abstract risk scenario. Moreover, the perceived severity
does not increase notably when adding more informa-
tion about the data processing, i.e., the analysis of the
data and an explanation of usage patterns. Even when
confronted with the possibility of personal harm due to
data collection and analysis, lay users do not seem to
consider serious consequences, probably because they
lack the imagination of what their data could be used
for. This is in line with previous research (e.g., [11]),
which has shown that lay users are often not aware of
specific privacy risks. Since privacy disclaimers generally
only refer to the “collection and analysis” of data, lay
users need to be made aware of specific adverse privacy
risks in order to consider them in their risk evaluation
and make an informed decision about using a technol-
ogy or service. Otherwise, their evaluation will be biased
regarding the severity of possible risks.
Most surprising are the results for the most abstract
risk scenario (R1) Collection, which is rated as some-
what more severe than the other abstract risk scenar-
ios, except for (R4) Possible harm in the smart home
devices use case. As all of the other abstract risk sce-
narios also include a reference to data collection, these
should at least reach equal values of perceived severity.
A possible explanation for this seemingly paradoxical
result might be the ubiquity of the “data collection”
phrase in the media, which is usually linked to negative
statements, leading to a “data collection is bad” heuris-
tic. Likewise, people could feel obliged to judge “data
collection” harshly to follow social norms.
Yet, people could actually be bothered by the exten-
sive collection of data nowadays and thus believe data
collection is in general a serious issue, without referring
to the extent of harm that could result from this collec-
tion. The vague description also leaves more room for
interpretation like the possibility of the technology’s de-
veloper passing on the data to third parties, while the
more concrete phrase “Your data are collected and ana-
lyzed” may imply that nothing further happens with the
data. Finally, the well-known “collection” phrase might
trigger an intuitive evaluation, whereas other expres-
sions (analysis, a comprehensive explanation of usage
patterns, possible harm) lead to a more thorough anal-
ysis of the possible risk and its severity. This is con-
sistent to the dual-process theory [53], which has also
been drawn on to explain the privacy paradox [54, 55]
by stating that people sometimes judge intuitively when
asked about their privacy concerns, and sometimes base
their evaluation on rational cost-benefit analyses [56].
It could thus be a promising approach to combine
the “collection” of data with specific privacy risk sce-
narios in order to increase users’ privacy risk awareness.
5.2 Specific Privacy Risk Scenarios
When presented with a single particular specific privacy
risk, lay users appraise it to be quite severe, but con-
sider it to be an individual case which is not likely to ap-
ply to themselves. Renaud et al. [57] attribute this lack
of problem awareness to the way people inform them-
selves, namely, by listening to stories told by others and
their personal experience. Likewise, research has shown
that media coverage of risks affects people’s perception
of how likely this risk is (a phenomenon also referred
to as “availability heuristic” [17, 58]). Garg et al. [59]
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Fig. 4. Relationship between the probability and severity rating scale for all use cases combined.
therefore suggest to include reports on privacy risks like
job loss due to data sharing on Facebook in public cam-
paigns in order to discourage users from sharing their
information on Facebook. Besides the inclusion in pub-
lic campaigns, this approach could also be implemented
in interventions and trainings which aim to raise pri-
vacy awareness. A first attempt to this can be found at
https://www.teachingprivacy.org, a privacy awareness
project which includes media reports on privacy inci-
dents in their lessons about privacy issues.
Taking a closer look on the risk evaluations for
severity, our results suggest that risks with a physical
safety component (stalking, burglary) are perceived to
be most severe. This is in line with previous results [8].
The risk of burglaries is further associated with a fi-
nancial loss, a circumstance which also contributed to
high values of perceived severity in earlier survey stud-
ies [8, 36]. Another contributing factor could be that
people’s understanding of burglary should be rather
similar, whereas the idea of restricted freedom in nutri-
tion choice or the publication of inappropriate content
probably differs to a greater extent between the partic-
ipants. Hence, the consequences of burglary should be
easier to grasp, whereas other risks relate to a multiplic-
ity of consequences, with several of them being rather
harmless.
In previous studies, career-related risks have been
found to be among the top-rated risks (for job loss [16]),
as well as being less serious than other risks (for not get-
ting promoted [35]) or coming not as easily to mind as
other risks [27]. According to our results, worse chances
for job applications are also considered to be less severe
than other risks in the OSN context.
Regarding probability, worse chances for job ap-
plications are perceived to be least likely in all three
use cases. This is in line with the availability heuristic,
which states that risks that are less present in people’s
mind are also considered to be less risky [17]. However,
this finding could also be due to the fact that people
think this risk does not apply to them, either because
they are not looking for a new job at the moment and
not planning to do so in the near future, or because they
assume none of the content they share would worsen
their chances in an application for a new job.
Contrary to earlier research [36], embarrassing con-
tent was not found to be more likely than other risks.
However, our example described embarrassment due to
identity theft, and thus also referred to impersonation,
which may be considered as rather less likely.
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Fig. 5. Relationship between the probability and severity rating scale, depicted as scatterplots.
5.3 Use Cases
Earlier research indicates that the newness of a risk con-
tributes to a higher risk perception and thus new tech-
nologies should be perceived to be more risky [19, 20],
although there is also evidence for the opposite, with
novel technologies being considered to be less risky [18].
In line with this, our descriptive results suggest that
this relationship might be complicated: The abstract
risk scenarios are considered to be more likely, but ap-
proximately equally severe when related to the use of
a well-known technology (OSN) compared to two rela-
tively new technologies (smart home and smart health
devices). The specific risk scenarios, on the other hand,
are considered to be equally likely, but less severe when
associated to the use of OSN compared to the use of
smart home and smart health devices. This implies that
in some cases the differences in risk perceptions between
new and common technologies might be reasoned in dif-
ferent perceptions of severity regarding specific risks,
whereas in others people might be referring to differ-
ences in how likely an abstract risk is.
Our results provide some further insights into the
severity perception of lay users. Actually, the sever-
ity perception should not differ between the considered
use cases, as the severity of stalking, burglary or worse
chances in job applications is supposed to be the same,
regardless of what has caused them. As the severity eval-
uations differ between the three use cases, however, peo-
ple seem to consider factors beneath the actual risk, e.g.,
to what extent a stalker or thief could benefit from the
data shared in an OSN compared to those shared by
using a smart health device.
(R6) Stalking, for example, is evaluated as most se-
vere when related to the use of smart health devices. If
a stalker gains access to the data collected with a fitness
tracker which collects GPS data, s/he would have the
possibility of tracking the user’s location almost twenty-
four-seven. Smart home devices, on the other hand, only
provide information about whether the user is at home
(or probably when s/he’s going to come home or leave
the apartment/house). OSN usually leave the decision
about when and what content should be shared up to
the user, so the publication of one’s location can be con-
trolled more easily when using OSN than the other two
considered technologies and thus is attributed lower val-
ues of severity for stalking. The risk of burglaries, on the
other hand, does not depend on the knowledge of one’s
location but only on the information about whether
somebody is at home at a certain time. Accordingly,
the perceived severity of this risk reaches nearly equal
values for the use of smart home and smart health de-
vices, but is considered as less severe when using OSN.
Overall, the abstract risks associated with using
smart home devices are perceived as slightly more severe
than those relating to the use of smart health devices
or OSN. This could be due to the diverse functionalities
of smart home devices. Since many people lack expe-
rience with this new and complicated technology, they
might be uncertain what risks could actually arise from
its usage, but feel like there is quite a great possibility
for adverse consequences, as reflected in the high value
of perceived severity for the “possible harm” risk sce-
nario. Smart health devices, on the other hand, collect
data that are easier to grasp (e.g., location, nutrition,
physical activity) and are thus associated with higher
severity concerning specific privacy risks. OSN, finally,
provide other levels of control about what kind of data
are shared when and with whom.
Hence, the data shared on OSN are less valuable for
attackers and thus specific privacy risks relating to the
use of OSN are rated as least severe. This also fulfills
people’s desire to control how they present themselves
when others are watching [60].
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5.4 Influence of Culture
The possible influence of cultural specifics should be
kept in mind when drawing conclusions based on our
results. There are a number of studies on cultural differ-
ences regarding privacy perception and behavior, with
conflicting results regarding differences, for example, be-
tween German and US-American users. Whitman [61],
argues that Europeans (and mainly German and French
people) define privacy protection as the protection of
their dignity, whereas US-Americans associate privacy
with the freedom to manage their own life without inter-
ference from the government, especially in their home.
Based on these considerations, the (R5) Nutrition sce-
nario, in which participants are restricted in their choice
of nutrition, should be more severe for US-Americans
than for Germans. Since US-Americans also strongly de-
mand to be left alone in their own home, they should
also consider (R7) Burglary to be particularly severe.
For Germans, on the other hand, those risk scenarios
that imply a loss of face, such as the distribution of (R8)
Inappropriate content should be considered as increas-
ingly severe. Further studies are needed to determine
whether the aforepostulated cross-cultural difference for
those scenarios indeed holds.
Empirical results from other studies [62] indeed sug-
gest that Germans consider the possibility of someone
using their posts on social media to embarrass them
to be considerably more severe than US-Americans,
though this also holds true for their posts being used
against them by somebody or being shared with third
parties. On the contrary, US-Americans considered it
somewhat more likely that the information will by used
by someone to harm or embarrass them.
Concerning the general assessment of privacy risks,
some researchers claim that Europeans might be less
concerned about their privacy since the use of their data
is closely protected by law – an effect that has already
been demonstrated in a 2008 survey regarding the Safe
Harbour Agreement [63] and should be strengthened
with the introduction of the new GDPR in May 2018.
Yet others argue that Germans are more aware of
potential consequences of data misuse, as the violation
of strict European data protection laws usually come
along with extensive coverage of this topic by the me-
dia [64]. In line with this, study results indicate that
Germans are more worried about their privacy in OSN
than US-Americans [62, 65]. Drawing on the seminal
concept of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions [66], Trepte
et al. [67] show that Facebook users from countries with
high values of uncertainty avoidance, such as Germany,
place higher importance on the avoidance of privacy
risks, as these are often unspecific and hard to grasp
and, therefore, associated with uncertainty. An overview
of cultural differences regarding privacy in social me-
dia is provided by Ur and Wang [68]. However, further
research is needed to decide whether Europeans or US-
Americans are more aware of and worried about privacy
issues, or if they just pursue different concepts of pri-
vacy, as indicated by Whitman [61].
5.5 Implications for Risk Communication
The present study provides several insights for pri-
vacy researchers or activists who aim to raise lay users’
awareness of privacy risks. First, neither abstract nor
specific risk scenarios alone will succeed in raising peo-
ple’s privacy risk awareness, since the former are con-
sidered to be less severe and the latter to be less likely.
Hence, a combination of different specific risk scenar-
ios held together by the notion of data collection (as in
R1) is needed in order to increase people’s evaluation of
how likely the described scenarios will occur. Introduc-
ing additional concepts like the analysis of data (as in
R2), usage patterns (as in R3), and personal harm (as
in R4) do not seem to add substantial value to the com-
munication. Specific risk scenarios that are perceived to
be most severe are those describing the possibility of
financial loss (e.g., (R7) Burglary) or threats to one’s
physical safety (e.g., (R6) Stalking). Moreover, specific
risk scenarios which leave little room for interpretation
were considered to be more severe in our study and are
thus most appropriate to increase people’s severity per-
ception. Yet, since specific risk scenarios do not apply
to the same extent to all people, it might also be neces-
sary to include several specific risk scenarios to address,
for example, people whose nutrition is rather unhealthy,
people who are currently looking for a new job and peo-
ple whose nutrition is perfectly healthy or who are not
going to look for a new job in the near future alike.
Second, the use case to which the risk communica-
tion refers to should also be taken into account. The
more an attacker can benefit from the data provided
by using a particular technology in order to harm the
user in a specific risk scenario, the higher are the values
for perceived severity and probability. Hence, which risk
scenarios work best depends on which data are provided
by the user and collected by the manufacturer or service
in the considered use case. Third, whenever it is unclear
which specific scenarios might fit the intended use case
of a specific instance of risk communication or when-
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ever the target population cannot be clearly specified,
(R1) might be the best choice. Users perceived (R1) in
all use cases as the most likely scenario. Furthermore,
it was generally perceived as of medium severity and in
all use cases achieved the highest severity rating found
among the abstract scenarios. Last but not least, es-
pecially researchers should be aware that while cross-
cultural influences in privacy risk communication are a
logical extension of taking the use case into account, the
field leaves many open questions.
5.6 Limitations and Future Work
Several limitations apply to our study. First, since we
only included participants who currently lived in Ger-
many, our results may not be generalizable to other cul-
tures. However, we are currently planning to conduct a
follow-up study with participants from other European
countries to allow for comparison of the results across a
wider range of cultural backgrounds. Second, we used a
panel to recruit our participants, thus it is likely that our
sample is biased in terms of age, academic background
and technical expertise, as it might be younger, higher
educated and overly tech-savvy. We do also not know
how many and which participants dropped out before
finishing the questionnaire due to technical restrictions
of the clickworker panel. Third, we only considered a
selection of possible privacy risks in three use cases. We
aimed to include a mix of more and less obvious ex-
amples for the categories of privacy risks identified by
Karwatzki et al. [34]. However, this might have biased
our results, as more obvious examples could have lead
to different evaluations of the risk scenarios. It would
thus be worthwhile to conduct another follow-up study
to check whether the results also apply to other risk
scenarios and use cases. Forth, we applied a between-
subject design. The results are expected to be (at least
slightly) different if we had used a within-subject design.
However, since one of our goals was to investigate how
people perceive different privacy risks in the context of
risk communication, we decided to show them only one
risk scenario to evaluate their perception of these in-
dividual risks, independent of other potential risks, to
allow for conclusions about whether the individual risk
scenarios are appropriate for risk communication. Also,
with a within-subject design, it would have been hard
to prevent a bias due to sequence effects.
6 Conclusion
We investigated lay users’ risk perception of different
privacy threats that could arise from using OSN, smart
home and smart health devices. Our results suggest that
there might be two clusters of privacy risks, with ab-
stract risks (e.g., collection and analysis of data) being
evaluated as likely but only of mediocre severity. Spe-
cific privacy risks, like stalking or targeted burglary, on
the other hand, reach higher values of perceived severity,
but are perceived as less likely. As our participants con-
sider the abstract risk scenarios to be less severe than
the specific ones, it is possible that they are not aware of
specific serious consequences that could result from data
sharing. Hence, it is necessary to raise their awareness of
specific privacy risks in order to enable an informed de-
cision about using potentially privacy-threatening tech-
nologies. Yet, if confronted with particular specific pri-
vacy risks, lay users consider them to be less likely than
the abstract ones. A possible solution could thus be to
combine several risk scenarios and report on real world
examples to increase the perceived probability of spe-
cific privacy risks. The present study further provides
insights into the severity perception of lay users in gen-
eral: Since specific risks, like stalking or burglary should
be evaluated as equally severe across different usage con-
texts, lay users seem to take other factors into account
when assessing the severity of privacy risks, e.g., how
much a possible attacker could benefit from the data
users provide when using the respective technologies.
Hence, different use cases might call for different risk
scenarios in terms of risk communication, with those
risks scenarios which provide the best opportunity for
an attacker to harm the user in a particular use case
being most promising.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Results of the Pairwise Comparisons
Table 5. Results of the post-hoc tests regarding the comparison of perceived probability of the risk scenarios (DV) between the differ-
ent risk scenarios (IV). A ↑ with the corresponding p-value indicates a significantly greater value of perceived probability for the risk



























(R1) < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑
(R2) < .001 ↑ = .003 ↑ < .001 ↑ = .003 ↑ < .001 ↑
(R3) < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑










s (R1) < .001 ↑ = .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑
(R2) = .005 ↑ < .001 ↑
(R3) = .045 ↑ = .02 ↑










s (R1) = .001 ↑ = .001 ↑ = .044 ↑ < .001 ↑
(R2) = .029 ↑ = .047 ↑ = .015 ↑
(R3) = .031 ↑
(R4)
Table 6. Results of the post-hoc tests regarding the comparison of perceived severity of the risk scenarios (DV) between the different
risk scenarios (IV). A ↑ with the corresponding p-value indicates a significantly higher value of perceived severity for the risk scenarios




























(R6) = .005 ↑ = .012 ↑
(R7) < .001 ↑ = .008 ↑ < .001 ↑













(R6) = .003 ↑














(R6) = .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ = .001 ↑
(R7) = .005 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑ < .001 ↑
(R8)
(R9)
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7.2 Results of the Item Analysis
The results of the item analysis are displayed in Table
7 for the pilot study and in Table 8 for the main study.
Table 7. Results of the item analysis for the pilot study. Cron-
bach’s α for the probability scale=.977.






Table 8. Results of the item analysis for the main study. Cron-
bach’s α for the probability scale=.936.







Welcome & Informed Consent
Dear participant, we are pleased that you are taking
part in our study related to the use of digital services.
Your opinion is very important to us. First, we ask you
to answer some questions about your ownership of dif-
ferent devices and services. You will be given informa-
tion about the devices and services we are going to use
later in the study and you will be asked to provide an
assessment on these devices. Then we will present you
with a number of fictional cases and statements to which
your consent or rejection is requested. The survey ends
with a few demographic questions. This survey will take
approximately 10 minutes to complete.
Please read the following text carefully be-
fore proceeding.
There will be no physical safety risks during the
study. The responses you enter during the course of
the study are recorded. Other than this, no data are
collected. The recorded data are evaluated and further
processed in the course of the data analysis and pub-
lished in project reports. It will be impossible to trace
the source of the information back to you. The study can
be terminated at any time, without providing reasons
and without any negative consequences. Your decision
to approve the use, and dissemination, of your infor-
mation is completely voluntary. However, if you do not
give permission, it will not be possible for you to partic-
ipate in the study and you will not receive the promised
remuneration. You will receive 2.10efor your participa-
tion. You only have to sign to confirm receipt of the
remuneration. An additional benefit is increased knowl-
edge of security and applications within the ”Internet
of Things”. By participating you will make a valuable
contribution to our research.
By pressing the ”I agree” button, you authorize us
to use your answers and access them till the end of the
project. Please note that you can withdraw the autho-
rization at any time during the study. In that case, all
your data will be deleted.
Technology Use
– Do you use social networks (e.g., Facebook, Xing,
Google+)?
– Do you use smart home devices (e.g., a refrigerator
that is connected to the internet, light that is con-
trolled by movements, digital assistants like Alexa)?
– Do you use smart health devices (e.g., measuring
devices for blood pressure connected to the internet,
fall detectors, fitness tracker)?
Answer options: Yes, I often use [use case], Yes, I
sometimes use [use case], I never use [use case] but I’d
like to in the future, I never use [use case] and I don’t
like to in the future
Presentation of Use Case
Note: 1 out of 3 use cases is presented, it is randomized
which participant is presented which use case.
OSN. A social network refers to an online service
which allows users to share their opinions, experiences
and information, and offers the opportunity to commu-
nication easily with other users. Social networks display
relationships (e.g., friendships, acquaintanceships, etc.)
between the users. Often, social networks focus on a
particular context (e.g., professional or private). The
advantages for users are the opportunity to effortlessly
stay in touch with other users from the respective con-
text (e.g., friends) and exchange news. Popular social
networks are, for example, Facebook or Google+.
Smart Home Devices. Smart home refers to a
household in which household appliances (e.g., refriger-
ator, washing machine, vacuum cleaner), integrated de-
vices (e.g. lights, windows, heating) and entertainment
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electronics (e.g., TV, voice assist, game consoles) are
networked and can be controlled via the Internet.
This new technology delivers several conveniences:
– Increased quality of life e.g. concerning the refrigera-
tor by detecting low supplies of important products
and automatic ordering of these
– Building protection e.g. concerning lights by indi-
vidual profiles for switching on and off
– Simplified ordering processes e.g instructing voice
assistants such as Alexa via simple verbal orders
Smart Health Devices. Smart health describes a
household in which health equipment (e.g. blood pres-
sure monitor, scales, thermometer), special sensors (e.g.,
drop sensors, sensors in the toilette, heat sensors) and
wearables (e.g. smartwatches, fitness trackers or smart-
phones) are connected.
This new technology delivers several conveniences:
– Improved information for doctors, e.g., blood pres-
sure measuring instruments reporting and transmit-
ting regular measurements
– Improved emergency response, e.g., drop detectors
sending a direct emergency message to the rescue
service
– Improved Health, e.g., fitness trackers analyzing
your sleep patterns
Presentation of Risk Scenario
Note: 1 out of 9 risk scenarios is presented, it is ran-
domized which participant is presented which risk sce-
nario. See section 3.4 and 3.4 for the risk scenario texts.
Evaluation of Risk Scenario
– It is extremely likely that the situation described
above will occur
– The chances of the situation described above occur-
ring are great
– There is a good possibility that the situation above
will occur
– I feel that the situation described above will occur
Scale: strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (100)
– Assuming that the situation described above would
occur, this would be...
Scale: innocuous (1) to extremely devastating (100)
Privacy Concerns
[Items taken from the IUIPC questionnaire’s global
information privacy concern scale [41]]
Demographics
– Gender: male, female, other
– Age: <20, 20–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 56–65, 66–75,
76–85, >85
– Profession / course of study:
– How many years have you been working in the field
of IT security, e.g., as a student, researcher or prac-
titioner?
End
Thank you very much for your participation! We
would like to thank you very much for your help. If you
have any questions about the study, please send an e-
mail to nina.gerber@kit.edu. Your confirmation code is
[...]. Your answers have been saved and you can now
close the browser window.
7.4 Availability of Data
Anyone who is interested in receiving the (anonymized)
data should feel free to contact us at any time.
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